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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CECIL R. MARTIN,

Plain'tiff and Respondent,

No.

vs.

9565

CARL EHLERS,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the verdict and judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable A. H.
Ellett, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries and property damage arising out of an intersection collision between the
plaintiff driving his automobile and the defendant driving an
emergency police vehicle.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the verdict and for judgment
in his favor as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The collision occurred in the intersection where 7th East
Street intersects 27th South Street in Salt Lake County, Utah.
7th East Street is 37 feet, 11 inches wide. The west side of the
street is 19 feet wide with one traffic lane; the east side of
the street has two trafficlanes separated by a solid line. 27th
South Street is 39 feet, 11 inches wide on the west side of the
intersection and 41 feet, 1 inch wide on the east side. There
are two lanes for eastbound traffic. (Tr. 5, 6 and 7, Exhibits
P1, P2 and P3).
The point of impact was located 24 feet, 7 inches south of
the north curb line of 27th South Street and 13 feet, 4 inches
north of the south curb line of this street, and 17 feet, 10 inches
east of the west curb line of 7th East Street. (Tr. 9 and Exhibit

Pl).
The intersection was paved with asphalt (Tr. 5) and was
level (Tr. 10). The sun was shining and the roads were dry
(Tr. 10, 76 and 98). The collision occurred about 5:30p.m. in
heavy traffic. (Tr. 12 and 13).
2
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The appellant is a deputy sheriff for Salt Lake County.
(Tr. 94). On June 10, 1959, at about 5:30p.m. he was responding to an emergency call in a police automobile. (Tr. 96). It
was equipped with a siren and two spotlights. The siren was
located under the hood in the front of the automobile and the
red spotlight was located at the bottom of the windshield on
the right side of the car. The white spotlight was located in
the same position on the left side of the car. (Tr. 97 and 98).
Both lights were burning and the siren was constantly sounding
from the time the officer began the emergency journey until the
impact occurred. (Tr. 97, 98, 103 and 104). The posted speed
limit on both streets was 30 miles per hour. (Tr. 31). As he
approached within one block of the intersection where the
accident occurred, he was driving south on 7th East Street
between 35 and 40 miles per hour. (Tr. 98 and 99). There were
automobiles stopped at the north, south and east entrances
to the intersection. (Tr. 71, 99, 109 and 110). It was necessary
to drive on the east side of 7th East Street because of the
traffic stopped on the west side of the street at the intersection.
(Tr. 77). As the police car neared the intersection, it was free
of traffic. (Tr. 79). The officer slowed for the intersection
and shifted into a lower gear. ( T r. 82, 90, 101 and 111) . When
the vehicle entered the intersection, it was struck broadside by
respondent's car traveling in an easterly direction on 27th
South Street, at about 30 miles per hour. (Tr. 48). The semaphore for east-west traffic had turned green as respondent
was from 30 to 50 feet from the intersection. (Tr. 48). Respondent testified that he did not hear the siren nor observe the
police car at any time prior to its entering the intersection.
(Tr. 50). His automobile skidded 24 feet, 9 inches before the
impact. (Tr. 9 and 10).
3
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Two witnesses revealed themselves to the investigating
officers. One of them, J. Thomas Fyans, was stopped north
of the intersection. His car was the first in line at the intersection facing south. (Tr. 78). He heard the siren and saw the
emergency vehicle when it was 500 to 600 feet north of the
intersection. (Tr. 77). The siren sounded continuously until
the impact. (Tr. 81). Fyans stayed in position while the police
vehicle approached, even though the light turned green for
Fyan's direction of travel. (Tr. 78, 79, 80 and 91).
The other witness, Daniel R. Gehrke, was directly behind
the Fyans automobile and he also heard the siren and saw the
red light burning on the vehicle. (Tr. 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43).
The impact knocked the emergency vehicle in a southeasterly direction where it spun around and struck a vehicle
stopped in the northbound lane of traffic on 7th East. It then
slid up against a utility pole on the southeast corner of the
intersection. The respondent's automobile moved approximately
10 feet after the impact and came to rest facing in a southeasterly direction near the center of the northbound lane of
traffic. (Tr. 17 and 18, Exhibit Pl) ~
As respondent approached the intersection, he noticed
cars stopped at the north, south and east entrances to the
intersection and also that there was no moving traffic in the
intersection. (Tr. 71). He was moving about 30 miles per
hour at the time of impact and hadn't slowed down for the
intersection. (Tr. 29, 68, 70 and 72). Both cars were damaged
beyond repair and respondent received a minor chest injury.
(Tr. 83, 101, 102 and Exhibits P4 and P5).
4
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POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
II. RESPONDENT WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the officer, was
responding to an emergency call and was therefore not subject
to the usual rules and regulations governing the use of the
highway by motorists. Title 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended. He also had the right of way. Title 41-6-76,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
An independent witness stated that the police car had
its siren sounding and red light operating at least five to six
hundred feet before the impact occurred. (Tr. 76 and 77).
The siren and red light were continuously operating up to the
point of impact. (Tr. 80 and 81). It should also be noted that
the emergency vehicle was reducing speed as it approached the
intersection. (Tr. 82). The evidence showed conclusively that
with the exception of respondent's automobile, all other traffic
5
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had stopped at the entrance to the intersection awaiting the
emergency vehicle. (Tr. 78 and 79). Since the officer was
conforming to the statutory requirements of notice to be given
by an emergency vehicle, coupled with the fact that all automobiles within his view had stopped to yield the right of way
to him, he had a right to proceed upon the assumption that
the other automobiles on the highway would yield the right
of way to him. See Lakoduk vs. Cruger, (Wash.) 296 Pac.
2d 690, more fully hereinafter discussed.
The evidence further shows that when the respondent's
automobile came into view of the officer, there remained less
than 25 feet in which to bring the emergency vehicle to a stop.
(Tr. 9). Even at a speed of less than 20 miles per hour, the
officer could not have stopped in time to have avoided the
accident. His vehicle was struck broadside from the right. (Tr.
100 and Exhibit P4).
It is respectfully noted at this point that the jury found
that the officer had his car under proper control. (R. 54).
It is therefore respectfully submitted that by virtue of the
facts as indicated above, there was no substantial evidence
upon which a jury could base a finding of negligence in the
way the officer was operating the emergency vehicle. The only
finding by the jury that the officer was negligent, which negligence proximately caused the accident, was that he was driving
too fast for the conditions then and there existing. (R. 54).
A well reasoned opinion from the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington involving facts very similar to those. in
the instant case, with a statute substantially the same as our
6
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Utah statute, is set forth in the aforementioned case of Lakoduk
vs. Cruger, 296 Pac. 2d 690. In this case, a fire truck proceeded
through an intersection against a red light while sounding
its siren and displaying a red light in response to a fire alarm.
The plaintiffs entered the intersection from a right angle to
the fire truck and their pickup truck was struck broadside by the
fire truck, killing three occupants of the pickup truck. With
the exception of the fact that in the instant case the respondent
collided with the emergency vehicle, the facts in the two cases
appear to be the same. In reviewing the Washington Motor
Vehicle Act, which is virtually the same as the Utah Motor
Act involved herein, the Court, at page 701, quoted from the
decision of Lucas vs. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 475, 75
Pac. 2d 602, as follows:
"The expression 'with due regard for the safety of
all persons using the highway' was explained in the
Balthasar case where the Court said: 'It is evident
that the right of way of fire apparatus over other
vehicles is dependent upon due regard to the safety of
the public only insofar as such due regard affects the
persons required to yield the right of way. Notice to
the person required to yield the right of way is essential,
and a reasonable opportunity to stop or otherwise
yield the right of way necessary in order to charge a
person with the obligation fixed by law to give precedence to the fire apparatus. This is the only reasonable
interpretation that the statute will bear. If the driver·
of an emergency vehicle is at all times required to
drive with due regard for the safety of the public as
all other drivers are required to do, then all the provisions of these statutes relating to emergency vehicles
become meaningless and no privileges are granted to
them. But if his 'due regard' for the safety of others
7
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means that he should, by suitable warning, give others
a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, the
statutes become workable for the purposes intended.' "
See also the case of State of Washington vs. United States,
9th Circuit, 194 Fed. 2d 38.
The Washington Court then went on to say, in substance,
that an arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted to an emergency vehicle cannot be predicated upon the elements of speed,
and failure to observe other vehicles on the road, where a
warning has been given. The Court stated at page 703:
"In the case at bar, there is no conflict in the evidence relative to the use of the red lights and the
continuous sounding of the siren with which the hose
wagon was equipped. Fourteen disinterested witnesses
heard the siren when at various points in the vicinity
of the intersection, some of them at a greater distance
from the approaching fire apparatus than was the farm
truck. The conclusion seems irresistable that Mr.
Lakoduk either did hear the siren but failed to heed
the warning, or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have heard it."
See also Holser vs. City of Midland, 330 Mich. 581, 48
N.W. 2d 208.

It should be noted in our instant case that all automobiles
at the intersection either heard or observed the emergency
vehicle approaching and yielded the right of way, as required
by law, with the exception of the respondent. The facts show,
without contradiction, that the officer had every right to expect
that other users of the highway in front of him would yield
the right of way, as every automobile in view had stopped. The
8
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respondent failed to produce any evidence to show that had the
officer been driving in any other manner he could have avoided
the accident when respondent's automobile came into view.
Under the conditions as they then existed, it would be highly
unreasonable to expect the operator of an emergency vehicle
to bring his automobile to a stop in a distance of less than
25 feet. Under such a state of facts, the conclusion is irresistible
that the officer was not negligent, nor did he in any way proximately cause or contribute to the happening of the accident.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENT WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The evidence shows without contradiction that two independent witnesses saw and heard the emergency vehicle approaching the intersection. It is also clear that the drivers of all
the other vehicles in the vicinity of the intersection, whose
names were never disclosed, were also aware of the approach
of an emergency vehicle and yielded accordingly.
Witness Fyans stated that he heard and saw the emergency
vehicle approaching the intersection when it was at least 500 to
600 feet to the North of the intersection. (Tr. 77 and 78).
Witness Gehrke also heard and saw the officer approaching.
The respondent maintains that he neither saw nor heard the
emergency vehicle approaching as he neared the intersection,
although all other cars at or near the intersection had stopped
and yielded the right of way to the officer. This problem was
also considered in the Lakoduk case, supra, at page 703, wherein the Court said:

9
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"The deceased driver of the farm truck . . . was
required upon hearing the siren, to yield the right of
way by driving to the right curb, stopping, and remaining-there until the emergency vehicle had passed when
( 1) the authorized emergency vehicle was approaching
and ( 2) was giving audible signal by siren. This
statute is unambiguous. Since appellants had red lights
on their vehicle flashing and _were giving the required
audible signal, the deceased driver will be deemed to
have seen and heard that which was there to be seen
and heard by a reasonably prudent driver, exercising
due care for his own safety. Under the provisions of
this statute it became the mandatory duty of the deceased driver to yield the right of way. He failed to
obey the mandate of the statute. It must therefore be
held, as a matter of law_, that his failure to do so was
negligen·ce, which was a proximate cause of the acci-dent." (Italics ours).
It is respectfully submitted that after the officer in. our
present case gave the required signals, the respondent was
required to. yield the right of way to him. The officer had a
right to rely upon the signals given and the right of way
granted him by statute until such time as he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the respondent
was not going to yield the right of way. _This could only have
occurred at the time the respondent's vehicle entered the intersection. The evidence reveals that less than 2 5 feet was traveled
by the emergency vehicle before being struck broadside by
respondent's automobile. With such short notice of impending
danger, it was impossible for the officer to stop. As also was
stated by the Washington Court in the Lakoduk case:
"Appellants did not see that the farm truck was not
going to accord the hose wagon the right of way until
10
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the farm truck actually entered the intersection and
was about 25 feet directly in front of the hose wagon.
It affirmatively appears by undisputed evidence that
at that moment there was not appreciable time for
appellants to avert the certain disaster which inevitably
followed." Lakoduk vs. Cruger, supra, at page 703.
Accordingly, in our instant factual situation, the officer
could not have been the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Respondent must have been at least contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. Both drivers had an equal opportunity
to see and avoid each other but were unable to do so. If the
officer was negligent in failing to avoid the collision, because
of the proximity of the respondent, then so must the respondent
have been negligent. The officer had a statutory right of way
and a right to assume that the respondent would heed his
warnings in compliance with the requirements of the statute.

If, after colliding with an emergency vehicle the operator
of the disfavored vehicle is permitted to escape his responsibility
under the statute, requiring him to yield, by merely saying that
he did not see or hear the emergency vehicle, even though all
other operators in the immediate vicinity did see or hear the
emergency vehicle, the statute then becomes meaningless. If
respondent is to be judged in the light of a reasonable prudent
person under the circumstances, he must then be charged with
either having seen or heard the emergency vehicle approach
as did all other drivers in the immediate vicinity. His failure
to then yield would be negligence and at least a substantial
and contributing factor in causing the accident. If the operators
of emergency vehicles cannot place reasonable reliance upon
the statute granting them the right of way, then the only safe
11
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course of conduct for them is to obey all traffic rules and
regulations while proceeding on an emergency call. This will
effectively convert a speedy errand of mercy into a casual ride at
the expense of person in imminent peril. Public policy requires
speedy assistance be given to those whose lives are in peril and
this of course is the reason for the statutes applicable thereto.
Emergency vehicle operators are required by the due performance of their duty to expose themselves to unusual risks
of injury by answering emergency calls. If, in return, they
are not granted a strong measure of protection in the performance of their duties, the obvious result will be an emergency
journey without haste and at the expense of the public. This
is not what the legislature contemplated in passing statutes
for the benfit of such emergency vehicle drivers.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY.
The trial court, by its Instruction No. 16, instructed the
jurors that both respondent and appellant were to be judged
by the same standard of care. (R. 48) . This line of reasoning
also was included in the Special Verdict. (R. 54). Appellant's
counsel duly excepted to the same. (Tr. 120). Even in those
jurisdictions where the courts submit issues of speed to the jury
as a question of fact in determining whether the driver of an
emergency vehicle is exercising due regard for the safety of
others, the standard of care to be exercised by the operator of
the emergency vehicle is not judged by the same standard as
12
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an ordinary motor vehicle operator. See McKay vs. Hargis,
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1958, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.
2d 456, wherein that Court stated that the test is, did the
officer exercise
"the care which a reasonably prudent man would
exercise in the discharge of official duties of like
nature under like circumstances."
Appellant respectfully submits that the standard of care
exercised by an operator of an emergency vehicle should be
judged by the standard of care exercised by other operators
of emergency vehicles and not by the usual standards required
of other ordinary drivers on the highway. In accord with this
position is the case of City of Baltimore vs. Fire Insurance
Salvage Corporation of Baltimore, Supreme Court of Maryland,
1959, 219 Maryland 75, 148 Atl. 2d 444, wherein that Court
stated at page 448:
"In holding that operators of authorized emergency
vehicles are liable for ordinary negligence under the
statute mentioned, we do not, of course, mean to state
that their conduct in the operation of such vehicles is
measured by exactly the same yardstick as the actions
of the operators of conventional vehicles ... However,
they are bound to exercise reasonable precautions
against the extra-ordinary dangers of the situation
that the proper performance of their duties compels
them to create."
The trial court, by giving its Instruction No. 16, in effect
held the appellant to the same degree of care as other motorists
using the highway and did not take into consideration the fact
that the officer's conduct in operating an emergency vehicle
in the performance of his duties should be measured in this
13
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light. Such an instruction was misleading to the jury in that
no standard o£ care for emergency vehicle operators was presented to them so as to attain an intelligent determination
of the issue.

CONCLUSION
In the case of Jensen vs. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 Pac.
2d 838, this Court considered the applicability of Utah statutes
relating to emergency vehicles under the 1949 amendment to
the Motor Vehicle Act in question wherein emergency vehicles
were required to slow down as may be necessary for safe operation before proceeding through red lights. Since the Jensen
opinion was rendered, the Utah legislature saw fit to amend
the Motor Vehicle Code, insofar as it relates to emergency
vehicles, by removing the requirement of slowing down before
proceeding through red lights or stop signs. (Italics ours).
Title 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The
jury specifically fol,l!ld that the appellant had the emergency
vehicle under control. There was no evidence in our instant
case to show that had the officer been driving at a slower rate
of speed the accident could have been avoided. At a time when
the officer knew or had reason to know of respondent's inattentiveness, there was not appreciable time for him to have
averted the collision with less than 25 feet remaining in which
to stop. The facts in the instant case are not in any way similar
to those in Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 Pac. 2d
884, where this Court, in reviewing the evidence in that case,
found evidence that would support a finding of negligence
against the police officer. In the Johnson case, the evidence

14
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indicated that the accident occurred on a rainy day during the
noon rush hour and that the parties to the accident could have
seen each other while 200 feet apart. Unlike the instant case
there was, or should have been, knowledge on the part of the
officer while 200 feet from the scene·. of the accident, of the
inattentiveness of the other driver and with such knowledge,
he proceeded into the intersection where the accident occurred.
Speed, right of way, and such other ordinary rules .of the
road have no application because the emergency driver is
specifically exempted by statute from complying with those
rules, and is only placed under a duty to ·drive with due regard
for others under the circumstances.
The respondent was at least contributorily negligent in
failing to yield the right of way to appellant. All traffic in the
vicinity had stopped to yield the right of way to the emergency
vehicle. The respondent claimed that he did not ever hear a
siren although the window was down on the driver's side of the
automobile (Tr. 69) and the siren was constantly sounding
right up to the moment of impact. Respondent must have
heard the siren and chose to ignore it. If, in fact, he did not
hear the siren, at a time when all other drivers in the immediate
vicinity were yielding the right of way, then he nevertheless
must be charged with hearing that which in the exercise of
ordinary care would have been heard, and his failure to do so
was negligence.
The Court's instructions to the jury placed the same burden
of care upon both operators. The appellant's actions were
measured by those of an ordinary vehicle operator upon the
highway and not by a standard of care that a reasonably prudent

15
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man would exercise in driving an emergency vehicle under
circumstances.

lik~

Appellant respectfully submits that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's _finding that he was negligent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the accident. The evidence further shows that the respondent
was at least contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that
the Court erroneously instructed the jury. There is absolutely
no dispute in the evidence as to what occurred and under this
set of facts and circumstances, justice dictates that the verdict
and judgment should be reversed and set aside, and judgment
entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no
cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Appellants
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